Who monitors the ‘Monitors’ in the public sector?

A combined theoretical agency - structure approach by Narayan, Jashwini J.
 
Fijian Studies Vol. 15 No. 2 © Fiji Institute of Applied Studies 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
Who Monitors the ‘Monitors’ in the Public Sector?  
A Combined Theoretical Agency-Structure Approach 
 
Jashwini Narayan 
 
Abstract 
Based on the extended Agency-Structure model, this article ad-
dresses the issue of public sector board accountability. It exam-
ines the public sector board-CEO relationship, corruption and 
accountability in state owned enterprises. Findings suggest that 
it is not always the case that agency dominates, it is also nei-
ther that structure dominates. In a given situation, either can 
dominate and within a given context, agency or structure’s 
dominating effects can change.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The 1980s attempt to reform the public sector by reducing the size 
of it and its costs appeared to have assumptions on the proper conduct and 
sense of public service (Doig, 1995). Reforms brought about establish-
ments of boards of directors of public sector institutions; these have been 
modelled around private sector boards (Farrell, 2005). Whether these 
have 'worked' is not clear. For one, the pre-reform and the post-reform 
performances need to be assessed with the same measuring tapes. This 
does not seem to have been done so far. Compounding the problem of 
measurement, is the recent revelations of 'ethical scandals' in state owned 
enterprises. This warrants an examination of ethical leadership in public 
sector organizations (Hassan et al., 2014). Such scandals also prompt the 
strengthening of existing public accountability arrangements and the de-
signing of new ones (Bovens et al., 2008). Existing literature highlight 
both accountability ‘deficits’ as well as ‘overloads’ (Bovens et al., 2008).
 This article examines the role of board of directors' as monitors, 
and their relationships with CEOs in the public sector. The article's 
benchmarks are the role and responsibilities of boards specified in litera-
ture, and the recent developments on Agency-Structure debate aimed at a 
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better understanding of corporate governance in public sector entities. 
Some cases from the Fijian public sector would be examined. Institutional 
cases are useful for contextualized analysis examining typical and atypi-
cal public sector board-CEO relationships and accountabilities. The 
unique challenges faced by developing island public enterprises have di-
mensions that set them apart from the corporate sector of other countries. 
 Specifically, this article extends the Agency-Structure debate by 
combining the two theories to the public sector setting. The Agency The-
ory concerns the behaviours when a 'Principal' hires an 'Agent' for acting 
on its behalf or to provide some service. The theory deals with agent op-
portunism, where the agent begins to optimise its/his own profits/gains at 
the expense of the principal. The principal tries to control the agent by 
creating incentives and/or investing in information systems to monitor 
agent activities. According to the theory, a board of directors represents 
the key internal control mechanism to align agent interests to that of the 
principal. Agency theory has been used to explore and describe risk-
sharing among individuals and groups (Eisenhardt, 1989); it has also 
dominated the public sector accountability research (Schillemans and 
Busuioc, 2015).  
Given that a board is the monitoring entity as per Agency theory, 
there is an ongoing debate between Agency and Structure. According to 
the Structuration Theory, agency and structure enable as well as constrain 
each other where structure includes rules (which guide and provide direc-
tions on how and what activities should be carried out by agents) and re-
sources (which assist agents in carrying out activities). While rules and 
resources enable agent activities, these also constrain agency since agents 
have to act within rules and resource usage has restrictions. 
This article advances this debate using both the theories. Structure 
is useful given that not only top management but boards as monitors have 
also been alleged to fail in their monitoring role in favour of their per-
sonal interests. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
 Agency Theory (AT) has become the dominant theory in corporate 
sector management studies and research. While AT has for long been 
employed to explain performance of management and boards in the pri-
vate sector, the effort to extend AT and research to not-for-profit organi-
zations has been more recent; now public sector accountability research is 
dominated by AT (Schillemans and Busuioc, 2015). This article applies 
and extends the Agency-Structure debate by drawing factors from the 
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public sector, board and Agency-Structure literature to include key fac-
tors in the proposed model. The article employs the Agency-Structure de-
bate as a framework for the public sector board monitoring role and their 
relationship with CEOs. No such theory currently exists. While there may 
be other perspectives available, this article makes use of the Agency-
Structure debate because this appears the most important and relevant to 
the research question. 
 The origin of the Agency Theory goes back to the 1960s and early 
1970s as economists explored and described risk-sharing among indi-
viduals and groups (example Wilson, 1968; Arrow, 1971 cited in Eisen-
hardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).1 Eisenhardt recognises Ross (1973) and, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as those who broadened the risk-sharing lit-
erature to agency problem that emerges between cooperating parties with 
different goals and division of labour. According to Mitnick (2006), 
Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick were the earliest scholars to clearly pro-
pose the Theory of Agency. Mitnick introduced the viewpoint that institu-
tions form around agency and evolve to deal with agency while Ross ini-
tiated the Economic Theory of Agency (Mitnick, 2006).  
 The key actors in the Agency Theory are the principal and the 
agent. Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea behind Agency Theory. 
 
Figure 1: Principal-Agent Problem 
 
 
 
(P: Principal, A: Agent) 
(Source: Klein, 2009) 
                                                        
1 This section relies on Narayan, Singh and Naz (2015: 38-40). 
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The 'Principal' is the party that pays the 'Agent' for either the agent 
to act on behalf of the principal or the agent to provide some service to 
the principal (International Energy Agency-IEA, 2007). For instance, an 
owner or employer (principal) pays an employee (agent) to act on his or 
its behalf. The employee is required to provide a service such as produc-
tion of goods for sale (IEA, 2007). 
 Central to this theory is the assumption that the agent may begin 
optimising its/his own profits/gains at the expense of the principal. This is 
called agent opportunism. In this way, Agency Theory reminds us that 
much of the organisational life is based on self-interest, particularly of the 
agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agent may optimise its profits at the ex-
pense of the principal as it may not share the principal’s goals (Hadi and 
McBride 2000). Any lack of partner compatibility and goal incongruence 
can result in conflict and opportunistic behaviour (Moeller, 2010; 
Wickramasinghe and Lamb, 2002). The principal, thus, needs to guard 
against such agent opportunism or agent’s ‘sub-optimal behaviour’.  
 An agent displays opportunism or ‘sub-optimal behaviour’ when it 
carries out activities which are not in line with what the principal wants 
(Wickramasinghe and Lamb, 2002). Such a situation is possible because 
the agents have more knowledge or information than the principal, on 
account of the fact that they are the ones carrying out the activity on 
behalf of the principal on a day to day basis; they have a certain level of 
information empowerment (Hadi and McBride, 2000). Agency Theory 
suggests that while economic inefficiency cannot be avoided in principal-
agent relationships, there are ways in which relationships between these 
two key parties can be made efficient (IEA, 2007). The principal can, for 
example, control the agent by creating incentives to persuade and encour-
age the agent to efficiently perform the principal’s wishes (Hadi and 
McBride, 2000).  
 Another assumption of Agency Theory is that the principal tries to 
guard against agent opportunism by investing in information systems to 
control agent opportunism, specifically trying to get enough information 
on agency activities through investing in monitoring systems (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The Theory suggests that the board of directors represents the key 
internal control mechanism for the principal that can be used to align the 
divergent interests of the managers (agents) to that of the shareholders 
(principal). One of the other assumptions of Agency Theory is that inde-
pendent outside directors in a board can lessen insider opportunism as 
well as lessen insider (management/employees) influence over the board. 
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The Debate 
 
 Wendt (1987) is an early paper on the Agent-Structure debate in 
management literature. The heart of the debate was on the relationship 
between agents and structures. Structuration theory argues that agency 
and structure enable as well as constrain each other (Gould, 1998). Ac-
cording to Giddens (1979), each shapes the other. Giddens used rules and 
resources to explain structuration. Rules lay the conditions and in turn al-
low individuals to intervene to respond to choices offered by the rules, 
Thus rules convert individuals into agents (Gould, 1998: 81). Wendt had 
argued that while rules are necessary for agency, Structuration 'lacks a 
fully developed mechanism capable of explaining the means by which 
agents and structures constitute one another' (Gould, 1998: 80). Overall, 
four approaches have emerged from the ongoing debate; these are reduc-
tionist, determinist, conflationist and relationist (Reed, 2003). 
 The reductionist theorists often reduce structure to agency; gener-
ally agency is seen as the summative outcome of structure which margin-
alizes if not erases the significance of structure (Reed, 2003). In contrast, 
the determinist approach argues that it is structure that dictates agency, as 
it programs, controls, as well as directs agent actions (Reed, 2003). For 
these theorists, structure is independent, unaffected by agency whereas 
agency is subservient to structure (Reed, 2003). 
 The third approach is that of conflationism. Here, a structure col-
lapses into agency and is only traceable as ongoing strips of social inter-
action, i.e., structures are reproduced through social practices (Reed, 
2003). While Giddens and Bourdieu insisted on mutual and equal co-
determination of agency and structure, they rejected any conception of 
structure. To them structure does not pre-exist, it is only in practice, in 
agents’ memory, thus generally collapsing structure into agency (Reed, 
2003). 
 The relationist approach views agency and structure as interrelated 
but separate components as it formulates a conception of agency and 
structure (Reed, 2003). 
 Researchers like Ashforth, et al. (2008) suggest some blending of 
agency and structure. Afterall, important components of corporate crime 
relate to both agency and structure. What is now emerging are theories 
that aim to unite agency with views of structure (Lane, 2001). Cockerham 
(2005), for example, considered both agency and structure, placing em-
phasis on restoring structure to its appropriate position. There is a need 
for an analytical framework that coherently links the two. 
 This article applies and extends the Agency-Structure debate by 
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drawing elements from the public sector, board and Agency-Structure lit-
erature for the proposed model. A combined Agency-Structure model for 
the public sector has been a critical omission in public sector studies. 
Inquiries on this basis can enrich our understanding of relative dominance 
of agency and structure. This article argues that detailed empirical as-
sessments using the extended model may shed light on issues and ac-
countability challenges facing public enterprises. While the empirical 
study for this paper is grounded in Fiji, the study does have potentially 
wider application for public enterprises elsewhere.  
 As per the research question and in keeping with the literature re-
viewed, the following theoretical model was developed, illustrating the 
relationship between agency and structure in the setting of a public enter-
prise depicting board monitoring role and board-CEO relationship and 
their self-interests. The agency diagram (on the right) with the factors of 
principal, agent, self-interest and asymmetric information is drawn from 
the study of Klein (2009). Principal is the party that pays the agent for ei-
ther a) the agent to act on behalf of the principal or b) the agent to provide 
some service to the principal (International Energy Agency-IEA, 2007). 
This diagram is modified to add boards (as monitors) and their self-
interest (board members can also have self-interest). Structure (on the 
left) includes factors of: rules and resources, structure being produced and 
reproduced and, agency enabled and constrained drawn from studies of 
Giddens (1984) and Lane (2001).  
 
 
Fig. 1: Combined agency-structure theoretical model 
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Methodology 
 
 This article employs institutional case based approach and is based 
on interdisciplinary literature review of role of boards and Agency-
Structure debate, coupled with illustrative discussions of senior level pub-
lic sector corruption. The article uses content analysis of specific relevant 
public enterprise documents and a few in-depth semi structured face-to-
face interviews. Enterprise annual reports, cabinet decisions, legislation 
and parliamentary reports, newspapers and reputable magazines were ex-
amined for relevant information and for formulation of certain organiza-
tion specific questions for interviews as well as for cross-checking inter-
viewee responses. For interviews, convenience and snowballing non-
random sampling techniques were used whereby individuals who were 
the easiest to reach out to were interviewed first (convenience); these in-
terviewees recommended others who could be interviewed (snowballing). 
In this way, information was gathered from many sources enabling 
triangulation among different data sources (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 The Ministry of Public Enterprises, Tourism and Communication 
(MPETC) was initially approached for interviews. Altogether, thirteen in-
depth interviews were conducted. A detailed description of the interview-
ees is withheld given political and job security concerns. Before the ac-
tual interviews, interviewees were informed that the purpose of the inter-
view was academic research and that respondent names will not be dis-
closed nor stated in later publications. Anonymity encouraged the inter-
viewees to give out relevant information without the fear of being ques-
tioned later on their responses. For this reason, interviewee names are 
withheld; quotations do not indicate the designations of interviewees. 
This is also in line with research ethics. 
 The interview sessions were for forty-five minutes to one hour fif-
teen minutes in length, keeping in mind the respondents’ time and con-
centration. The researcher noted issues related to the board/CEO and cor-
ruption from archival search for certain interview questions given that in-
terviewees may not or cannot recall certain events or would simply want 
to avoid talking about some adverse events.  
 This research called for a flexible and unrestrictive questionnaire 
structure. Questions were thus asked in an open-ended manner to allow 
for sufficient flexibility so that interviewees could respond in their own 
way. Tape-recording was not given importance in this research because 
interviewees do not feel comfortable with their views being tape-
recorded; they speak more freely when no hard evidence (taped re-
sponses) is collected. For this reason, notes were manually recorded on 
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paper. After the interviews, the researcher rephrased the interviewees’ re-
sponses to capture the gist of what was understood by the researcher; at-
tention was paid to ensuring that the receiving, understanding and inter-
pretation of information were the same as expressed by the interviewees 
(Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003).  
 Collected information was analyzed on the basis of findings from 
the case studies in forms of responses from the interviewees and relevant 
documents which helped the researcher document and explain findings. 
Evidences, discussions and conclusions on this scope were based on con-
tent analysis. This research used the logic of analytic rather than enu-
merative induction and thus used Gillham’s (2001) transcription and ana-
lytical framework for the recording, verification and analysis of data. 
Substantive statements in each interview note and extra details (furnished 
during the interviews) were highlighted while repetitions, digressions and 
irrelevant materials were put aside. Similar statements made by inter-
viewees were noted as similarities and dissimilarities were marked. After 
going through interview notes, the researcher went back to these notes the 
second time to highlight substantive statements that might have been 
missed out in the first reading. Following this, the researcher went 
through the collected documents to highlight noteworthy information. 
The researcher then went back to the entire interview notes and docu-
ments to note the highlighted statements and categorized these as the key 
events. For validity and reliability reasons, statements were cross-
referenced between interviewees’ responses’ and with documents such as 
company and ministry documents, published interviews in reputable 
magazines and newspaper articles. Dissimilar statements were marked as 
queries and after a few days, queries were clarified through quick repeat 
interviews, emails or telephone inquiries.  
 The article is limited in terms of sector and sample size; only one 
country was studied. As such findings are not as readily generalizable 
unlike larger sampled studies. Also, case study evidences achieved are 
valid only for the concrete cases under analysis. Nevertheless, given the 
reform related transformations currently underway in public enterprises 
across the world, studies such as these are not only timely but can have 
policy implications in the area of the role and accountability of boards 
and anticorruption legislation. The article does offer insights for future 
comparative studies of countries with similar developing status. Further 
research may carry out larger scale studies and also make comparisons 
between public and private organizations. The major contribution of this 
research is the elaboration on the ongoing Agency-Structure debate and 
the combined agency structure theoretical model.  
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Results 
 
Post Fiji Limited (PFL) 
 
 Since its inception until 1989, Fiji’s postal operation was a division 
of a government department - the Department of Posts and Telecommu-
nications. In January 1990, the department was corporatized as Fiji Posts 
and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL). In June 1996, the much 
awaited separation of Posts and Telecommunications was formalized re-
sulting in two new enterprises, Post Fiji Limited (PFL) and Telecom Fiji 
Limited (TFL).  
 The PFL is led by a government nominated Board of Directors. All 
directors except for the Managing Director (MD) / Chief Executive 
officer (CEO) have been outsiders. The directors are experienced 
individuals from various business sectors, having served in various other 
boards. In 2007, The Fiji Times newspaper reported that the PFL audit 
reported serious allegations of malpractice of the former MD; it was 
claimed that upon his resignation in February 2007, he was paid a gross 
compensation of $246,479.89, a net of $122,481.39 after deductions. In 
addition, he received $24,000 as gratuity, a payment he was neither 
entitled to nor allowed for in his contract. It is further claimed that this 
payment was not even approved by the Higher Salaries Commission. 
Even the then board chairman was alleged to have received allowances 
not entitled to. It was also alleged that the former MD approved a 
payment of $75,000 for the purchase of an external Seiko clock for PFL 
building from a company owned by the chairman without following 
proper tender procedures. Allegedly, the board chairman allowed this to 
happen, failing to disclose his interest and relationship with the company 
(The Fiji Times, 2011). The chairman claimed he knew nothing about the 
discussions on the purchase of the Seiko clock. The court convicted both, 
the MD and the Chairman (Nasiko, 2011a, 2011b). Accordingly, a new 
board was appointed. The chairman and three new board members were 
appointed in May and June 2007. Only one of the previous board mem-
bers continued while three others resigned in December 2006, before the 
audit period. The five member board was told by the Public Enterprise 
Ministry to seriously consider the recommendations of PFL’s audit report 
during their board induction session. In 2007, an acting CEO was ap-
pointed by the new board following the exit of the former MD on 28 Feb-
ruary 2007. In January 2009, a former executive from the Colonial 
National Bank was appointed as the CEO. This CEO also left PFL. The 
earlier alleged corrupt practices and board inductions led to changed 
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relations between the board and top management. The interviewee stated: 
The way activities are currently carried out at PFL can be 
described as stringent. For instance, the CEO is not part of the 
board but a representative of PFL who makes presentations to 
the board. The board then discusses the presentations amongst 
themselves for final decisions. Board meetings are held every 
month. Representatives from the Ministry of Finance and 
MPETC also sit in board meetings.2  
 
The CEO also does not have the discretion to approve funds of 
above $10,000 needed for capital purchases. All capital 
purchase requests of above $10,000 require board approval. In 
addition, the board needs to be kept informed on everyday 
affairs even operational matters. For example, matters such as 
the qualification and experience requirements of senior vacant 
positions are also determined by the board. The CEO is thus 
not given full autonomy.  
 
PFL’s board is heavily involved in the operations of PFL. 
However, the board-management relationship is quite good. 
All requests are thoroughly looked into before final 
endorsements but at times further information is requested 
before approvals. This drags approvals onto the next monthly 
meeting. It is this delay that is problematic. Coming from a 
commercial environment, the PFL environment proved 
restrictively different for the outgoing CEO. 
 
Fiji Ports Corporation Limited (FPCL) 
 
 The FPCL was formally known as Ports Authority of Fiji (PAF). 
Ninety-five per cent of imports and exports in Fiji are traded through the 
FPCL ports handled by its subsidiary, Ports Terminal Limited (PTL). 
FPCL was established after dual reforms in the port industry, a change 
                                                        
2 This presence is purportedly under s64(5) of the Public Enterprise Act (1996): 
A shareholder may at any time or times, by written notice to the secretary of a 
Government Commercial Company, authorise (on such terms and conditions 
as are specified in the notice) such person as the shareholder thinks fit to act 
as the shareholder's representative at any or all of the meetings of sharehold-
ers of the Government Commercial Company or of any class of such share-
holders, and any person so authorised shall be entitled to exercise the same 
powers on behalf of the shareholder as the shareholder could exercise if pre-
sent in person at the meeting or meetings. 
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initiated by the government through the public sector reform programme 
(Interviews with GM Finance and GM Ports Terminal Limited). The re-
organization process involved a split of PAF into two enterprises, a 
Commercial Statutory Authority (CSA), called the Maritime and Ports 
Authority of Fiji (MPAF), and a Government Commercial Company 
(GCC) named Ports Terminal Limited (PTL) (Interview with GM Fi-
nance). The FPCL was established during the second reform of PAF 
which saw the amalgamation of PTL and MPAF into one GCC, FPCL 
(Interviews with GM Finance and GM Ports Terminal Limited). FPCL 
began operations from 1 July 2005 (Interview with GM Finance).  
 FPCL and its subsidiary are governed by a Board of Directors that 
oversees the company’s performance. The first set of directors was ap-
pointed on 4 February 2005 by the Minister for Public Enterprises. The 
first CEO was also appointed in February 2005. A former board chairman 
was charged with one count of abuse of office by the Fiji Independent 
Commission against Corruption (FICAC) for which he appeared in court. 
He was alleged to have approved $177,000 in payment to the then CEO 
between 7 and 13 December 2006. The problem with this payment was 
that it was neither approved by the board nor by the Higher Salaries 
Commission (Fiji Village, 2008). As a result of the allegations, the 
chairman was removed from the board of FPCL. In November 2006, the 
then CEO was also sent on leave to allow for investigations into his 
alleged mismanagement. It is also alleged that he was paid during this 
investigation period. On 28 February 2007, a new chairman was ap-
pointed for a term of three years. Another board member was appointed 
on 4 February 2005. The deputy chairperson who was appointed later on 
28 February 2007 was relieved of board duties from 30 June 2008. Two 
other members appointed on 16 and 28 February were also terminated on 
30 June 2008. A director who was appointed on 30 June 2008 passed 
away on 9 December 2008. 
 Like PFL, the earlier alleged corrupt practices and changes in board 
and CEOs led to changed relations between the board and top 
management. One of the interviewees explains: 
Overall, FPCL cannot be described as a private sector firm. It 
cannot really operate independently given interferences and chal-
lenges. It is part of the government, thus has to be mindful of the 
government as well as its own policies. The board is very active 
and the key decider. Some speculate that the board lacks relevant 
qualification and that board appointments are also political in na-
ture. There are also claims that there may be better people 
around.  
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 The relationship between the board and management is also not so 
amicable. The situation is tight, so much so that the senior management 
almost unanimously voiced out disagreements but only to get suspended. 
As matters took a turn for the worse, MPETC interfered. Resultantly, the 
CEO and the GM Finance were suspended. An interviewee complains: 
Management is not allowed to manage. A high level of bureauc-
racy is present in forms of government dictation and political in-
terference. This is the biggest challenge for FPCL. All decisions 
have to go through the government. New innovative strategies 
are often declined. FPCL has many plans but these remain plans 
because the government, as shareholder tells them what to do.  
 
 In August 2009, the chairman resigned from the board after his at-
tempts of solving the ongoing internal bickering failed and went out of 
control. He was quoted as saying that he resigned in order to protect the 
independence of the board and the integrity of the position of the chair-
man (The Fiji Times, 2009). 
 
Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited (FHCL) 
 
 In March 1998, FHCL was established as a GCC to administer the 
commercialization of the mahogany forest resources. From its inception 
until 2003, FHCL remained dependent on government funding. FHCL re-
ported fluctuating losses, these being the highest in 2007. It only reported 
profits twice in the years 2008 and 2010. An interviewee informs: 
The year 2008 marked the first year of profits for FHCL. Credit 
for these positive changes goes to the Administrator and the then 
appointed Sri Lankan Financial Manager who worked closely to 
identify loopholes and put in place financial controls.3  
 As at 31 January 2011, debts of FHCL totalled about $26 million. 
Out of this, about $16.8 million was guaranteed by government (Nasiko, 
2011c). The interviewee explains: 
Because FHCL is about 80 to 90 percent export based even when 
it is yet to fully develop its export market, global crisis has had a 
significant adverse impact on it. FHCL is the most controversial 
of all public enterprises. Marred with landowner and political in-
terference and the 2000 coup after-effects, FHCL was never en-
tirely left on its own to function commercially from the outset. It 
was never really given a commercial environment to work in.  
                                                        
3 This appointment was done formally through advertisement. 
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 After the 2000 coup, there was a change in government. This gov-
ernment set up a new board for FHCL (Fiji Mahogany Act 2003: Online 
Resource). The changes to the board and the CEO incumbents at FHCL 
has seen a ‘come and go’ trend. The first CEO was an expatriate from 
New Zealand who held office from September 2003 to December 2003 
(MPETC, 2009). According to his successor, the first CEO left because 
he felt restrained by government interference. In 2004, the second CEO 
was appointed. This CEO also resigned after two years. The second CEO 
also admitted his frustration with such meddling. He complained: 'there is 
a lot of bureaucracy around. The issue is highly politically charged, it al-
ways has been, I think it always will be' (ABC Radio National, 2004). 
The third CEO was appointed in 2005 (MPETC, 2009). In May 2006, a 
new board was appointed. In November 2006, the employment of the 
third CEO was terminated while he was abroad. According to the board, 
the termination of the CEO’s contract marked the start of FHCL’s 
reorganization exercise. This came as a surprise to the CEO who was 
away in Australia. He exclaimed, 'I don’t know what’s going on' (The Fiji 
Times, 2006). The board claimed it terminated the contract when the 
CEO's health deteriorated (and because of a police enquiry) six weeks be-
fore the termination (Fiji Mahogany Act 2003: Online Resource). As per 
the MPETC (2009c), the third CEO was terminated on grounds of poor 
performance. While FHCL engaged in exports and appeared to be doing 
well, in reality this was not so. FHCL’s insolvent status was brought out 
into the open. An interviewee gives the following details: 
It was alleged that a former GM Manufacturing was undersell-
ing Fiji’s product overseas for a commission in Hong Kong. 
The FHCL board did not take it up any further except for de-
clining to renew his employment contract. The board decided 
not to waste time in investigations but took note of lessons 
learnt.  
 
FHCL was said to have achieved exports of containerized 
dressed mahogany timber (timber with premium finishing - 
very accurately sized with a very smooth surface, allowing 
coatings to be applied easily) within a short span of time. Ac-
cording to some staff, six containers were exported every 
week. Based on these reports, FHCL should have generated at 
least $12 million in income annually. But this was not so. Be-
fore the end of 2005, FHCL ran out of funds because the cost 
of production of mahogany timber was much higher for FHCL 
than the revenue it earned by exporting timber.  
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According to the interviewee, only when the insolvency of the 
company was brought out into open, that the board came to know about 
such issues. The rushed transition of FHCL into its extended role to a 
sawmill operator since 2005 gave way to abuse of office, leakages and 
anomalies at the top management level. As per the interviewee, boards 
were competent all along but if the data presented to them was inaccurate 
or if the needed information could not be processed from the data held by 
the enterprise, then the board will not be able to make effective decisions. 
This view notwithstanding, a competent Board would have been 
monitoring production and commercial aspects of the business. For any 
business of this nature, a mandatory part of reporting would be technical 
and financial performances reporting in every Board meeting. If the CEO 
or management were not providing detailed reports on these, then a com-
petent board would have raised concern and directed management to 
provide this regularly and without delay. Failing this, internal audit could 
have been relied upon, the Board did no such thing. 
 By the time police could question the CEO, he was said to have fled 
Fiji (Fiji Mahogany Act 2003: Online Resource). FHCL was technically 
insolvent in 2006. Also a former board chairman of FHCL, who was the 
coup instigator in the year 2000, was alleged of bribe-taking from a com-
pany he aggressively promoted for strategic partnership with FHCL. His 
bank statements revealed that two separate payments of $A5,000 were 
made to his Australian bank account; he was dismissed for alleged bribe-
taking (ABC Radio National, 2004; Feizkhah, 2001). 
 A review of FHCL’s operations was then carried out (The Fiji 
Times, 2006). As a result, the Board adopted 5 strategies, which included: 
the termination of the contract of the CEO to refocus and restrategize 
FHCL, recruitment of an excellent CEO, engaging an accounting firm 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC)) on a short-term basis, maximization 
and sustainable exploitation of hardwood forests to enhance export levels 
and earnings and, seeking government support towards financial 
assistance for FHCL. The board, when announcing the above changes and 
strategies, also indicated that it had assumed executive control from then 
onwards. An officer from PWC was appointed as the FHCL 
Administrator between December 2006 and February 2008. An expatriate 
was also formally appointed to the position of the Financial Controller 
(MPETC, 2009). Together, the PWC Administrator and the expatriate 
Financial Controller highlighted internal anomalies at FHCL. The inter-
viewee states:  
For the fourth time in February 2008, a new CEO was appointed. 
However, in November 2008, the board chairman resigned. He 
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expressed his disagreement on the new direction/set up for FHCL 
that was decided by the cabinet in June 2008. The chairman 
feared chaos and doubted the effectiveness of the new set up.  
 An interim CEO was appointed in May 2011. In May 2010, a three 
member board was appointed which increased to seven members in May 
2011.4 
 
Discussion 
 
 The theoretical model prepared for this research is supportive of the 
findings. Central to agency theory is the argument that the agent may op-
timise its profits at the expense of the principal (agent opportunism). In 
the case studies, the principal is the Fiji Government while the agents are 
the top management and the employees. As per the Agency Theory, the 
government (shareholder) is the principal; the agents are the top man-
agement and employees, whereas the Board is the internal control mecha-
nism – the monitor.5 Agent opportunism has been well illustrated in the 
case studies of FPCL, PFL, FHCL where the top management and/or the 
board members were engaged in transactions that benefited them person-
ally.  
 At Posts Fiji Limited, four former executives were charged with 
various offences ranging from abuse of office, extortion, aiding and abet-
ting abuse of office, and false certificate. Malpractice of a former MD 
was also highlighted. The former board chairman was alleged to have 
received allowances not entitled to. In addition, a former GM approved a 
                                                        
4 There are considerable uncertainties on the legality of board appointments. The rele-
vant legislation under which FHCL operated in 2010 is not clear.  In 2003, under the 
Fiji Mahogany Act (2003), the 'Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited, a Government 
Commercial Company declared under the Public Enterprise Act and incorporated un-
der the Companies Act, shall be transformed into a privatised Company for the pur-
poses of developing the mahogany industry in Fiji, including the harvesting and proc-
essing of mahogany forests.'. The legal requirements on board composition would be 
in the company founding documents. This is not available. 
5 This view needs re-examination. While the Board is the ‘monitor’ in effect, the 
Board functions as the agent of the shareholder. The shareholder, through the Minis-
ter, provides the legislation to the Board which contains the objectives of the entity 
which are to be met by the Board. The shareholder may also give directives to the 
Board. The Board will need to determine the compliance of such directives with the 
law. But in conduct, the Board remains the agent of the shareholder. In turn, however, 
the Board hires employees (management) to deliver on the objectives. In the Board-
Management relationship, the Board assumes the role of the principal, and the man-
agement becomes the agent. 
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payment for the purchase of an external clock from a company owned by 
the chairman, without following proper tender procedures. Allegedly, the 
board chairman allowed this to happen, failing to disclose his interest and 
relationship with the company, claiming that he knew nothing about the 
discussions on the purchase of the clock.6 
 
 At Fiji Ports Corporation Limited, a former board chairman was 
charged with one count of abuse of office and was alleged to have ap-
proved a payment to the then CEO which was not formally approved. 
Also, a former CEO was sent on leave to allow for investigations into his 
alleged mismanagement but was paid during this investigation period. He 
was removed from the CEO position. According to Sebatik (2013), 
former board chairman and the deputy chairman walked free given lack 
of evidence 
 At the Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited it was alleged that a 
former GM Manufacturing was underselling Fiji’s product overseas for a 
commission. A former FHCL board chairman was alleged to be bribe-
taking from a company he aggressively promoted for strategic partner-
ship. The third CEO was also terminated on ‘grounds’ of poor perform-
ance at the cost of production of mahogany timber was much higher than 
the export revenue. According to the interviewee, the FHCL board did not 
take this matter up any further in terms of due investigation and necessary 
followup like prosecution. The interviewee states that board decided to 
not waste time in investigations but take note of lessons. In the absence of 
any investigation in the performance of the CEO, a claim of non-
performance remains a claim. The likely reason for the Board to not take 
up the matter is that any further investigation would have shown that the 
Board itself failed to carry out its monitoring role seriously, at the least by 
not asking for and/or not examining the mandatory reporting on produc-
tion and financial performances. This itself would be dereliction of duty 
of a Board. 
 Agency theory also highlights that the principal tries to guard 
against agent opportunism by investing in information systems to control 
opportunism. The theory indicates that Board of Directors is one such 
                                                        
6 See, for example, Mahendra Motibhai Patel v FICAC Criminal Appeal No. 
AAU0039 of 2011; Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption V. 1.Tevita Peni 
Mau 2.Mahendra Motibhai Patel Crim. Case No: HAC089 of 2010; FICAC v 1. 
Mahendra Motibhai Patel, 2. Tevita Pen Mau, 3. Dhirendra Pratap Criminal Case No. 
HOC 005/2010; Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption  V. 1. Tevita Peni 
Mau 2. Mahendra Motibhai Patel Criminal Case No: HAC089 Of 2010. 
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relevant system for monitoring executive behaviours. A board is the key 
internal control mechanism. The case study enterprises were all led by 
board of directors who were outsiders. Agency theory asserts that inde-
pendent outside directors in the board can lessen insider opportunism as 
well as lessen insider influence over the board. This article argues that 
while a board is established to oversee management and to control agent 
opportunism, in the empirical cases, it became party to opportunism. 
Board members can collude with management for personal gains – lead-
ing to not only agent opportunism but also incapable of monitoring op-
portunism. As such, boards at times may not be the best control mecha-
nisms. Hence, the presence of a board does not translate into prevention 
of opportunism. 
ADB (2011, 2014) states that while Fiji has a sound public enter-
prise legislation (Public Enterprise Act 1996), it still lacks specific guide-
lines on director appointments, and monitoring staff, and monitoring con-
flict of interest by those sitting in Boards as observers. Observers from 
the Ministry, comprising ministry employees, can be deemed to be the 
eyes and ears of the ministry, making their presence make the board 
members wary of their performance. But the fact that the Ministry has to 
send observers to Boards is a clear indication of the lack of confidence 
which the Ministry, as the appointing authority, has on its own appoint-
ees. 
At root, the problem remains at the level of the principal. First, the 
principal does not take its responsibility as the shareholder seriously. In 
state enterprise situations, the principal’s representative, being the Minis-
ter, is not personally affected by the performance of the enterprise. As 
such, the behaviour of the representative would be open to negligence, 
representative optimisation by rewarding his political supporters with 
board appointments, or a more sinister criminal intent of using the board 
member(s) to further the pecuniary, personal or political interest of the 
representative. 
Second, the principal’s representative may not be fully or partially 
in compliance with the law. The FHCL case is indicative – where for one 
year (May 2010 to May 2011), only three members were on the Board 
which was later raised to seven.  
The role of the principal in a state enterprise setting requires greater 
and detailed investigation. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 This paper argues that the greater the opportunism, the greater the 
adverse impact on the principal. An organization will be on the losing 
side if opportunism is substantial and remains undetected. In such situa-
tions, the benefits that should accrue to the organization fill the pockets of 
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the agents and/or monitors, and may impact adversely on an organiza-
tion’s financial performance. The FHCL is a case in point. Under the 
leadership of the third CEO, FHCL was reported insolvent. Based on ex-
port reports of mahogany timber, FHCL should have generated at least 
$12 million in income annually. In contrast, before the end of the year 
2005, it ran out of funds because the reported cost of production was 
much higher than the revenue recorded. A former GM Manufacturing of 
FHCL was also alleged to be underselling the FHCL's product overseas 
for a commission; this information was not verified, and remains unveri-
fied to date. According to the interviewee, the board did not take this mat-
ter up. This is indicative of possibly greater problems than would meet 
the eyes, ranging from incompetence of the Board to negligence and 
fraud by a greater number of people than the GM. When a person, more 
so a representative of the public, does not take allegations of fraud to law-
ful authorities, the person would be deemed as aiding and abetting fraud. 
Thus, while the impact of agent opportunism can even be more serious if 
opportunism remains undetected, a fuller picture needs to be obtained by 
looking at the behaviour of the Board itself. This is where structure can 
be of much importance as it strikes back at agency by way of audits.  
 This article agrees with Agency theory that agents may optimise 
their profits at the expense of the principal but it disagrees with the expla-
nation that a board can be an effective mechanism to curb agent oppor-
tunism. It is argued that an independent audit is a better mechanism, 
unless auditors are corrupt and collude with corrupt agents or board 
members. The Public Enterprise Act 1996 (s100(3)) provides that the 
Board can appoint an auditor or the Ministry of Finance may direct the 
appointment of the Auditor General as the auditor. The annual audited fi-
nancial reports are presented to the public through the Parliament. How-
ever, by the time the annual reports are audited, significant time elapses, 
during which fraud and agent optimism may remain undetected. 
While agent opportunism is clearly illustrated in the empirical stud-
ies, structure, by way of audits did strike back to take to task some oppor-
tunists. Audits can even expose the doings of a board. This article thus 
argues that while agent opportunism cannot be totally prevented, they can 
be detected through external audits or a regulatory agency. The Structura-
tion theory argument of structures constraining agents thus holds true. 
When an audit discloses corrupt activities, the public enterprises ministry 
investigates the matter. When allegations are proved correct, the accused 
is suspended or sacked. In this way the board, the top management and 
the employees are not free to conduct activities as they please. The pro-
posed model of this article is supportive of this finding since it extends 
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structure constraining not only agents but also boards. The board, the top 
management and the employees are bound or as the Structuration theory 
explains, are constrained by the enterprise-specific rules and regulations. 
When such rules are ignored, the accused is taken to task. Some accused 
board and top management executives have had to face court proceedings 
and/or removal from their positions. Such structural controls, monitoring 
and actions on agent opportunism not only discourage agents’ self-
interest and encourage them to work towards principal’s interest but also 
keep inline the so called monitors – the boards. This can positively impact 
on financial performance since reduction in opportunism will mean less 
corruption. Also, employees and board members would know that they 
will lose their jobs, reputation and future job prospects if they promote 
self-interest and get caught.  
 While structure may not totally prevent corrupt practices, it does 
catch up with agency by way of audits. This is parallel to the argument of 
Cockerham (2005) who asserts that agency is no doubt important but 
structure can act back on individuals affecting their lifestyle patterns in 
particular ways. This implies that agency can dominate until an element 
of structure catches up with it. At this point, structure will have an upper 
hand as it is able to expose and initiate actions to take to task the corrupt 
agents. This article goes further than the argument of Cockerham (2005) 
and argues that if an organization is unable to recover what it had lost be-
cause of agent opportunism or if the auditors become party to corruption 
themselves, then agency will dominate. If structure is more powerful then 
it can enhance organizational performance by reducing agency thereby 
protecting the interests of the organization. Thus, if structure dominates 
then agency will be restricted, punished and loss will be recovered which 
will protect the interest of the organization. If agency is more dominant, 
then agent opportunism can continue without being detected. The greater 
the agent opportunism, the greater the loss to the principal. If agency re-
mains undetected, an organization will lose out with accumulating higher 
losses as agents continue to increase their share of personal benefits at the 
expense of the organization. However, even when agency is detected, it 
can still be problematic and dominate if the principal is unable to recover 
from the agents what it had lost and when agents are set free and not pun-
ished or when agents’ corrupt acts do not fully justify their punishments. 
This clarity in elaboration is a new and noteworthy contribution of this ar-
ticle, however more and larger scale research is required to substantiate 
this claim. However, this point is somewhat in line with Fleming and Zy-
glidopoulos’s (2009) view that important components of corporate crime 
include both agency and structure elements in setting the condition for es-
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calation of corrupt practices. 
 As it is, the recent ethical scandals of governments warrant further 
research on ethical leadership in public sector organizations (Hassan et 
al., 2014). It is thus suggested that the role, responsibilities and account-
ability of boards be strengthened. For instance, at the time of appointing 
board members, they should be thoroughly informed on how exactly they 
will be dealt with if caught practicing opportunism. This may include on 
the spot termination, litigation, strict jail terms, hefty penalty and even 
blacklisting. This is parallel to Bovens’ et al. (2008) suggestion of 
strengthening existing public accountability arrangements and designing 
new ones. At PFL and FPCL, governments taking actions on top man-
agement as well as board members and these being widely publicised by 
the media led to strained board and CEO relations. In one of the cases the 
board became over controlling, leading to top management feeling micro 
managed. While adequate control over top management is desirable, too 
much control discourages initiative and innovation leading to poor per-
formances as well as quick turnover in senior staff. Much more research 
work still needs to be done to address accountability issues. 
 
Contribution and Limitations 
 
 There are three theoretical contributions of this article. First, the 
study extended the Agency-Structure debate to the context of public sec-
tor board/CEO opportunism. This combined model was briefly empiri-
cally tested and was supportive by the interviewee responses and court 
judgments. However, detailed examinations of board papers and affida-
vits could not be carried out as these were not made available. The pro-
posed model utilized both agency and structure elements since both 
agency and structure set the condition for escalation of corrupt practices 
(Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009). Whereas the role of the board has 
long been debated, research efforts continue to suffer from deficiencies 
like lack of an overarching theoretical perspective (Hendry and Kiel, 
2004). Second, this model helped to better understand how boards as 
monitors may not always be the best control mechanism for accountabil-
ity. This paves the way for development of even more effective models. 
Third, this article sheds light on board and CEO collusion which have not 
been given due consideration in many public management studies. In ad-
dition, unlike the earlier study of Cockerham (2005), this article argues 
that dominance of either agency or structure cannot be predetermined and 
will depend on situations – even if structure catches up by way of audits, 
agency will still dominate unless damage to the corrupt agent is more 
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than that of the principal. While rules are necessary for agency, the struc-
turation theory cannot resolve the debate (Gould 1998). Situations may 
also differ where structures help the principal recoup all that has been lost 
and agent punishment fully justifies the corrupt act, in which case struc-
ture will dominate. This requires further research which could build a 
more effective and holistic theory.  
 The study should not be taken to exemplify the entire scenario of 
public sector corruption as it only briefly considers three public enter-
prises of one country. In addition the three enterprises discussed were 
'troubled' enterprises, not necessarily representing the totality of public 
enterprises in the country. The experiences of one country or few public 
enterprises may not be readily applicable to other countries/organizations. 
Caution thus must be exercised when making generalizations. It is envis-
aged that this article will inspire scholars to further examine the subject 
matter, using extended or combined theories in other countries.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This article examined the public sector board-CEO relationship, 
corruption and accountability, based on the extended Agency-Structure 
debate. The combination of the two widely debated theories helped utilize 
this debate in an important context within the public sector setting in Fiji. 
Findings suggest that it is not always the case that agency dominates, it is 
also neither the other way around where structure dominates. In a given 
situation, either can dominate and within a given context, the dominating 
effects can change. What can be stated, however, is that until agent op-
portunism (agency) is detected, for example through external audits or a 
regulatory agency (structure), agency tends to dominate. Once structure 
catches up with and appropriately deals with agency, structure will then 
dominate. However, if structure does catch up with agency but is unable 
to recoup what agents have opportunistically gained and agents are not 
adequately punished, then agency still wins.  
There is an added dimension which can be looked into in future re-
search – the representative of the principal can themselves be optimizers 
of their personal political and/or financial and/or communal interests. Ul-
timately, the fact remains that for public enterprises the representatives of 
the ‘principal’ are in effect nothing but agents of the real owners, who are 
the taxpayers and the state. A complete model would require this to be 
factored in. 
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